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1. INTRODUCTION
It is commonly supposed, by readers and admirers of Aristotle’s ethics, that the laws of 
the state have very little to do in his conception of the behavior and the deliberation of 
the truly virtuous person. The laws play a merely contingent role, both epistemically 
and motivationally, in the psyche and actions of the virtuous person: (1) epistemically, 
the virtuous person is perfectly capable of figuring out what the right thing to do is, 
and does not need the law to tell her, and (2) motivationally, the virtuous person does 
not need the threat of punishment to get her to do the right thing; unlike the immature 
person or ordinary sinner, she does the right thing for the right reason, that is, because 
it is the right thing to do, not because otherwise she might lose her good reputation or 
be punished.
That this is Aristotle’s view is strongly suggested by his way of distinguishing 
between the fully virtuous and less than fully virtuous by saying that the former are 
those who know what the right thing to do is and why, whereas the latter are those who 
merely follow rules set down by others, for example by one’s parents, or by the laws of 
the state. Aristotle quotes Hesiod to help him make the point:
Far best is he who knows all things himself;
Good, he that hearkens when men counsel right;
But he who neither knows, nor lays to heart
Another’s wisdom, is a useless wight.
(EN I 4. 1095b10–14, trans. Ross rev. Brown)
The point is that the merely “good” man lacks understanding, but at least can be cred-
ited with “hearkening when men counsel right”—that is, of following the instructions 
of others, thus approximating the behavior and actions of the fully virtuous person 
who is “far best.” Later, at the very end of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle returns 
to this thought—now explaining that the law is a good way of training the people of a 
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state for virtue, presumably via appeals to their sense of shame and nobility, and incen-
tives of reward and punishment (EN X 9. 1179b31–1180a5).
These passages and others seem to suggest that Aristotle thinks that the virtuous 
person really has no need of the law, either to tell her what to do, or to get her to do 
what she already knows she must do. The function of the law is, rather, to educate, 
train, and if necessary coerce that part of the populace in whom the virtues have been 
imperfectly and insufficiently inculcated. It is, even so, a rough and imperfect tool—
perhaps adequate for the masses, in the absence of anything better, but not the ideal 
method for moral instruction. It follows, or so it seems, that Aristotle’s moral theory 
can be understood independently of his theory of the aims and content of the laws of 
the state.
I want to argue that this is a mistaken view about the shape and ambitions of 
Aristotle’s ethics, for he thinks that there is an essential connection between virtue and 
the law. In this paper, I will take up and develop an argument made by Gisela Striker, 
namely that the virtuous person deliberates by thinking about what the law requires 
her to do.1 The law spells out in detail what the right thing to do is, and the virtuous 
person is someone who correctly grasps what the law requires of her, and does it for 
the right reasons. For the virtuous agent decides what to do by considering what is 
legislated for citizens in her society for the common good.
Now, it’s certainly true that Aristotle thinks that the virtuous person is not moti-
vated by the threat of punishment and the sanctions attached to any law. Her actions 
flow from her good character—not from her fear of punishment. It’s also true that the 
virtuous person doesn’t need the law to direct her actions, because she has phronêsis, 
that is, practical wisdom. For example, if she sees someone in need of her help, she 
doesn’t have to be told to give assistance; if she makes a promise, she doesn’t need 
reminding by the law that she ought to keep it. So the laws are not needed to tell the 
virtuous person what to do, and it also does not motivate her to do what she should 
do. The reason why every virtuous person is necessarily obedient to the laws is instead 
the following:
(1) Every virtuous person is just.
(2) Being just means being concerned to promote the common good.
(3) ∴ Every virtuous person is concerned to promote the common good.
(4) What will promote the common good is spelled out by laws (at least, by good laws 
in a well-ordered state).
(5) ∴ Every virtuous person is obedient to the laws.
1 Striker 2006: 134.
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Clearly, if we are to be persuaded by this line of thought, we will want to hear more 
about two related ideas. The first is the idea that a just person is necessarily a lawful 
and law-abiding citizen. The second is the idea that the virtuous person necessarily 
cares about the common good. In the rest of this paper, I will explore these two ideas. 
I hope to show that justice and its concern for the common good is central to Aristotle’s 
conception of the virtuous agent, and that justice, in turn, cannot be understood apart 
from the various laws that states devise for the common benefit.
2. THE JUST PERSON IS A LAWFUL PERSON
Let us start with the first idea, that being a just person means being a lawful and 
law-abiding citizen. At the outset I should acknowledge that in English, it sounds odd 
to call someone “just”; we think that institutions, laws, distributions, and states of 
affairs can be “just,” meaning above all that they are fair and equitable, but if you say 
that a person is “just,” it’s not quite clear, in English, what you mean. In Greek, when 
Aristotle talks about a man being “just” (dikaios), he means, as we shall see, that the 
person is law-abiding and that his relations with other people are as they should be, 
because he does what he should for other people, and has a concern for the good of 
others or for the common good. Thus, it might be better to translate “just man” here 
by “good man” or even “morally good person,” in order to capture the idea that one is 
“just” insofar as one’s relations with others are as they should be. Indeed, it has been 
suggested that for Aristotle, dikaiosunê “justice,” not aretê “virtue,” is the concept that 
corresponds most closely to our concept of moral goodness or moral rightness.2
In fact, Aristotle acknowledges that in Greek, there is an ambiguity between two 
senses of the word “just,” roughly corresponding to the idea of fairness and to the idea 
of moral goodness; as we might put it, there are in fact two distinct, but related, con-
cepts of justice in Aristotle.
Both the lawless man [ὁ παράνομος] and the grasping and unfair man [ὁ 
πλεονέκτης καὶ ἄνισος] are thought to be unjust [ἄδικος], so that evidently both the 
law-abiding [ὁ νόμιμος] and the fair man [ὁ ἴσος] will be just. The just [τὸ δίκαιον], 
then, is the lawful [τὸ νόμιμον] and the fair [τὸ ἴσον], the unjust [τὸ ἄδικον] the 
unlawful [τὸ παράνομον] and the unfair [τὸ ἄνισον].3 (V 1. 1129a32–b1)
2 Irwin 1986; Striker 2006: 135.
3 All translations of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics are from the Oxford translation by Ross 
revised by Brown (Oxford World Classics 2009).
107 Justice and the Laws in Aristotle’s Ethics
The term “unjust” (adikos) sometimes describes (1) someone who is “lawless,” a law-
breaker, and sometimes describes (2) someone who is “grasping and unfair.” Conversely, 
to call someone just is to say either (1) that he is lawful and law-abiding, or (2) that he 
is “fair.” Aristotle goes on to identify justice in the sense of lawfulness with the whole of 
virtue, and justice in the sense of being fair-minded with just a part of virtue, because 
it is an individual virtue of character, coordinate with courage, moderation, generosity, 
wittiness, and so forth (EN V 2. 1130b10–16). These two concepts of justice are tra-
ditionally called “general justice” and “special justice.” Special justice is the virtue that 
belongs to people who care above all about the fairness of social and political institu-
tions, arrangements and distributions of benefits and harms. Aristotle clearly has in 
mind a virtue that would belong to magistrates, statesmen, and especially judges—but 
presumably this is a virtue that all citizens in a good state should be expected to have. 
Special justice is a virtue that is conceptually secondary to a prior concept of fairness, 
understood as equality in distributions of goods, or equality in rectification of harms. 
General justice, by contrast—which is the subject of this paper—is a broader umbrella 
concept, which includes special justice, but goes beyond a concern for fairness, and has 
to do with correctness in one’s relations with other people quite generally.
So Aristotle describes general justice as the virtue of being a law-abiding person 
(the nomimos) who cares about the norms of society and obeys the constraints that are 
imposed on his or her behavior; general injustice refers to the person (the paranomos) 
who shows disrespect for the laws and norms of society, both written and unwritten. 
The law lays down constraints on behavior in many areas—for example, it requires you 
to pay your taxes, perform military service, keep your hands off your neighbor’s prop-
erty, support your parents in their old age, and so on. The just person obeys those con-
straints whereas the unjust person does not. (It is worth keeping in mind that Greek 
nomoi include laws both written and unwritten—and the latter includes customs, con-
ventions, and norms widely endorsed and followed.)
When Aristotle defines general justice in terms of lawfulness, he is insisting upon 
two things. First, his definition shifts the focus away from the motivational set of the 
agent, back to the behavior and actions of the agent described in terms of action-types. 
A person is just because he does the things required by the laws of society; he is unjust 
because he breaks those laws.4 Second, Aristotle is insisting that justice has to do with 
one’s relations with other people—it is above all a social virtue, spelled out in terms of 
laws that sometimes require one to confer benefits on other people. That justice has to 
do with one’s relations with other people, and that it requires obedience to the laws, 
4 Hence, general justice corresponds roughly to what Sachs calls the “vulgar conception of jus-
tice” in Plato’s Republic IV 442d–443a (Sachs 1963).
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are deeply familiar ideas in Greek thought. That it requires obedience to the laws is 
familiar for example from Antiphon’s On Truth:
Justice is a matter of not transgressing what the laws prescribe in whatever city 
you are a citizen of. (Oxyrynchus Papyrus XI no.1364, ed. Hunt, col. 1 line 6–
col. 7 line 15 = Antiphon DK 87B44, trans. McKirahan)
The idea that justice has to do with one’s relations with other people and more specifi-
cally that it requires one to benefit others besides oneself, is familiar from Thrasymachus 
in Plato’s Republic, for example, who says that justice is “the advantage of the stronger.” 
As he explains, the laws are the product of existing power relations in a state, and hence 
serve the advantage of those who are in power. That is, the just person always benefits 
someone else rather than himself (Republic I. 338d–339a).
Aristotle endorses this familiar conception of justice when he says that justice is 
lawfulness. In his view, justice has to do with proper relations with and fulfillment of 
obligations to others. It is a social virtue that belongs to people insofar as they live with, 
cooperate with, and rely on others. Furthermore, it is a virtue that is characterized 
above all by its benefits for a group of people—maybe only for other people and not for 
oneself, as Thrasymachus says so memorably.
3. OBEDIENT TO ANY LAW?
Aristotle thinks that the just person is lawful and law-abiding. But does obedience to 
the laws necessarily make one virtuous?5 It would only if the laws were good laws. After 
all, if one lived in a state where the laws were unjust, or badly conceived, then it would 
seem to follow that the virtuous agent would have the obligation not to follow the laws 
of that state. So when Aristotle says that “all lawful acts are in a sense just acts,” does he 
mean everything that any law sets out is just? And that there are no unjust laws? Is he a 
conventionalist about justice and the law?6 On the one hand, there is a close connection 
between nomos and doxa, such that a nomos is a norm or expectation generally accepted 
and endorsed by a group of people. Now in English usage of the term “law,” it is conceiv-
able that there could be a law that is unknown or not accepted by anyone. By contrast, 
5 The following discussion is greatly indebted to Kraut 2002: Ch. 4, esp. 103–25, which defends 
the cogency of Aristotle’s discussion of general justice.
6 One might think of Cleitophon’s interpretation and defense of Thrasymachus’ conception of 
the laws in Plato’s Republic I 340b: justice is what the stronger believes to be to his advantage. 
Kraut 2002: 104 cites for comparison Hobbes’ claim that no sovereign power can be guilty of 
injustice, because injustice consists in the violation of a covenant, and no sovereign makes a 
covenant.
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there couldn’t be a nomos which no one believes or endorses; nomoi are norms which a 
group of people regard as valid and binding, and includes customs, norms, and unwritten 
laws. Furthermore, the conceptual connection between nomos and dikaios is so tight that 
Myles Burnyeat has gone as far as to say that a law cannot be unjust;7 a law may be badly 
formulated, or ill-conceived, but cannot be adikos.
I am skeptical about the idea that Aristotle is a conventionalist about law, and also 
about Burnyeat’s specific claim that laws in Greek can’t be unjust. For Aristotle holds 
that laws can be unjust. For example, in Pol. III 11. 1282b8–13, he says that the laws 
must suit the regime, and since there have been both correct and deviant regimes, “it 
is clear that laws that accord with the correct constitutions must be just, and those that 
accord with the deviant constitutions not just.”8 So he clearly doesn’t think that laws are 
just simply because they are the law.
Rather, when Aristotle offers two arguments that obedience and lawfulness is 
indeed a virtue (EN V 1. 1129b11–25), he is thinking of obedience to laws that meet a 
certain minimum standard of correctness. Here is the first argument he offers:
Since the lawless man was seen to be unjust and the law-abiding man just, evi-
dently all lawful acts are in a sense just acts; for the acts laid down by the leg-
islative art are lawful, and each of these, we say, is just. Now the laws in their 
enactments on all subjects aim at the common advantage either of all or of the 
best or of those who hold power, or something of the sort; so that in one sense 
we call those acts just that tend to produce and preserve happiness and its com-
ponents [i.e. virtues] for the political society. (V 1. 1129b11–19)9
He argues that acts are lawful when they are laid down in accord with the lawgiver’s art 
(nomothetikê), and hence are in accord with the right laws; when they are lawful in this 
sense, they are just. This would imply that a law that was not in accord with nomothe-
tikê would not be a good law. What then is the lawgiver’s art? It is, in the first instance, 
7 I have heard Burnyeat say this at Princeton in the early 1990s; he apparently has an unpub-
lished paper on this which I have not seen.
8 See also Pol. II 8. 1268b38–1269a3 where he says that the laws of archaic societies are “simple 
and barbaric,” though he does not use the word “unjust” for them. Kraut 2002: 104 also mentions 
the distinction made in EN V 7 between legal or conventional justice and natural justice, where 
the latter seems to imply a basis for evaluating the justice or goodness of laws.
9 Ἐπεὶ δ’ ὁ παράνομος ἄδικος ἦν ὁ δὲ νόμιμος δίκαιος, δῆλον ὅτι πάντα τὰ νόμιμά ἐστί πως δίκαια· τά 
τε γὰρ ὡρισμένα ὑπὸ τῆς νομοθετικῆς νόμιμά ἐστι, καὶ ἕκαστον τούτων δίκαιον εἶναί φαμεν. οἱ δὲ νόμοι 
ἀγορεύουσι περὶ ἁπάντων, στοχαζόμενοι ἢ τοῦ κοινῇ συμφέροντος πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἢ τοῖς κυρίοις 
[κατ’ ἀρετὴν] ἢ κατ’ ἄu03BB_u03BBον τινὰ τρόπον τοιοῦτον· ὥστε ἕνα μὲν τρόπον δίκαια λέγομεν τὰ ποιητικὰ καὶ 
φυλακτικὰ εὐδαιμονίας καὶ τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς τῇ πολιτικῇ κοινωνίᾳ.
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the “controlling part” of political science, which is the same as practical wisdom (EN 
VI 8. 1141b23–5).10 But Aristotle does not now immediately move to the realm of 
ideal legislation, by saying for example that an act is just if it is in accord with the laws 
that an ideal legislator would legislate; instead, he simply says, “Now the laws in their 
enactments on all subjects aim at the common advantage either of all or of the best or 
of those who hold power, or something of the sort; so that in one sense we call those 
acts just that tend to produce and preserve happiness and its components [i.e. virtues] 
for the political society” (V 1. 1129b14–19).
I take Aristotle to be arguing as follows:11
(1) The laws in their pronouncements about everything—that is, the laws, both writ-
ten and unwritten—aim at (i.e. try to attain, but may fail to secure) the common 
advantage of a political community—whose membership may be more or less 
inclusive (inclusive in democracies and, perhaps, Aristotle’s ideal city-state, exclu-
sive in oligarchies and tyrannies).12
That the laws should aim at the common advantage can be true of legislation for a wide 
variety of political systems, ranging from more democratic to more aristocratic forms. 
But the common advantage he’s talking about is presumably not mere expedience, but 
genuine common benefit—ruling out cases like the law instituted by the Thirty con-
fiscating the property of metics to finance the Spartan garrison, which was perhaps 
10 There, Aristotle is concerned to defend his claim that practical wisdom and political wisdom 
“are the same state of mind, but their essence is not the same.” He thinks the widely held opin-
ion that practical wisdom requires one to mind one’s own business is wrong; instead, practical 
wisdom requires one to recognize the extent to which one’s own good depends on the good of 
others. As he says, “yet perhaps one’s own good cannot exist without household management, 
nor without a form of government. Further, how one should order one’s own affairs is not clear 
and needs inquiry” (EN VI 8. 1141b34–1142a11; see also Pol. III 4. 1277b25–30). See also Reeve 
1992: §§12, 20, 32; Schofield 2006: 318–21.
11 It is somewhat uncertain how exactly to construe the sentence: koinêi can go either with all 
four disjuncts (“the common advantage either of all or of the best or . . . ”, with Ross and Kraut) 
or just with the first (“either the common advantage of all or the advantage of the best or . . . ”, 
with Irwin 1988: 424–5), and some manuscripts omit kat’ aretên in the third disjunct; for helpful 
discussion, see Kraut 2002: 113n24. Kraut I think correctly notes that, however one construes 
the text, Aristotle’s meaning is clear: “however narrowly or broadly the political community is 
defined, justice in the broad sense produces and preserves happiness for the whole of it.”
12 One can either read Aristotle as saying, as here, that the laws are comprehensive, and address 
all matters, or as saying that the laws, in all the matters that they deal with, aim at the common 
advantage.
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expedient for the Thirty who were in power, but not to the common advantage of the 
political community. That is, he thinks that
(2) The common advantage of a political community consists of the happiness and its 
parts (i.e. the virtues) for the members of that community.
For this reason, it follows that
(3) Lawful acts—those in accord with laws that aim at the common advantage, that is, 
the production and preservation of happiness and its parts for the members of the 
political community—are therefore the ones we call just.
From the nature of the law and its orientation towards the happiness and virtue of 
the members of a political community he infers that lawful actions are just and virtuous. 
The argument, then, is that law-abiding behavior is just and virtuous because the aim 
of legislation is to promote the common good for the political community (as Aristotle 
frequently maintains elsewhere, cf. EN VIII 9. 1160a13–14, Pol. III 6. 1279a17–19, III 12. 
1282b16–18, III 13. 1283b35–42). The lawbreaker’s actions are unjust because they are 
inimical to the general happiness of a polis; he engages in anti-social behavior, and is a 
threat to the well-being of his fellow citizens.
Aristotle offers a second reason why law-abidingness is a virtue: it is precisely because 
the laws legislate virtue:
And the law bids us do both the acts of a brave man (e.g. not to desert our post nor 
take to flight nor throw away our arms), and those of a temperate man (e.g. not 
to commit adultery nor to gratify one’s lust), and those of a good-tempered man 
(e.g. not to strike another nor to speak evil), and similarly with regard to the other 
virtues and forms of wickedness, commanding some acts and forbidding others; 
and the rightly-framed law does this rightly, and the hastily conceived one less 
well. (EN V 1, 1129b19–25)13
According to this argument, the laws provide moral instruction and guidance, by 
prescribing forms of behavior that will promote virtue—or, more realistically (since 
then the task would presumably be endless), as here, by prohibiting forms of behavior 
13 προστάττει δ’ ὁ νόμος καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρείου ἔργα ποιεῖν, οἷον μὴ λείπειν τὴν τάξιν μηδὲ φεύγειν μηδὲ 
ῥιπτεῖν τὰ ὅπλα, καὶ τὰ τοῦ σώφρονος, οἷον μὴ μοιχεύειν μηδ’ ὑβρίζειν, καὶ τὰ τοῦ πράου, οἷον μὴ τύπτειν 
μηδὲ κακηγορεῖν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄu03BB_u03BBας ἀρετὰς καὶ μοχθηρίας τὰ μὲν κελεύων τὰ δ’ ἀπαγορεύων, 
ὀρθῶς μὲν ὁ κείμενος ὀρθῶς, χεῖρον δ’ ὁ ἀπεσχεδιασμένος.
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that are incompatible with virtue and common happiness. That the aim of politics is 
“making the citizens be of a certain kind, viz. good and capable of fine deeds” (EN I 9. 
1099b29–32; see also I 13. 1102a7–12) is emphasized throughout the Nicomachean 
Ethics. He returns to the thought that laws will provide moral education in EN X 9, 
where he compares the state to a father educating his children.14 Insofar as the laws aim 
to make citizens good, lawful acts will be virtuous.
But now we can reformulate the earlier question about obedience to the law: given 
the fact that many or perhaps most laws fall short of what ideal nomothetikê would 
legislate, doesn’t this imply that many or perhaps most laws are bad ones, and hence 
shouldn’t be obeyed? There is, of course, nothing sacrosanct about the particular laws 
that a particular state happens to have—and Aristotle is neither a relativist nor a reac-
tionary with respect to the laws. For example, in Politics II 8 he acknowledges that 
sometimes laws need to be changed.15 And as Richard Kraut has argued, even though 
Aristotle states in Politics III 4 that civic virtue consists of the ability to both rule and 
be ruled—and that it more specifically charges each citizen with the “preservation” (ἡ 
σωτηρία) of the constitution of the state to which he belongs (Pol. III 4. 1276b27–30; 
cf. Kraut 2002: 363–84)—even so, there are limits to what the good citizen will do. For 
example, in EN III 1, Aristotle says that there are some things that no one should con-
template doing, even if ordered by a tyrant. He also seems to think that under some cir-
cumstances, the good citizen ought to act to overthrow the constitution—for example, 
a tyranny (Pol. IV 10). Furthermore, Kraut argues persuasively that it is compatible 
with “preserving” the constitution that one act to meliorate its defects; in particular, if 
one lives in a democracy, which Aristotle regards as a deviant constitution, the good 
citizen will do what he can to prevent the more extreme and unstable forms of democ-
racy from arising. Such a citizen might, for example, advocate proposals for a mixed 
constitution—tempering a democracy with elements of an oligarchic constitution (see 
e.g. Pol. IV 13–14; cf. Kraut 2002: Ch. 12). All of these indicate that Aristotle fully rec-
ognizes that some laws and constitutions are defective and require change.
If, then, what makes laws good is that they aim at the common good, then this 
is the proper criterion for judging which laws are good and which are not. And it is 
possible for the lawgivers to miss the mark in one of two ways (Young 2006: 182). 
First, the lawgivers could hold a mistaken conception of happiness, but craft the laws 
well so that they do a good job of promoting this mistaken conception of happiness. 
14 For an idea of what laws and customs that educate citizens for virtue will look like, see Politics 
VII 13–17 and VIII.
15 De Romilly 1971 atttributes to Aristotle an anti-progressivist conservative thesis against 
changing the law on the basis of Pol. II 8, but see Brunschwig 1980.
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Second, the lawgivers could hold a correct conception of happiness, but fail to imple-
ment that conception well in the laws. Hence, drafting the laws of a state is presumably 
no easy matter. It is the job of nomothetikê, or the art of legislation, to formulate laws 
that correctly identify what is good for a community of citizens and that promote it 
well. Aristotle goes on in the Politics to argue that correct identification of the end and 
nature of the polis is what distinguishes the correct forms of constitution from the 
deviant ones (Pol. III 6, 7, 9); thus, for example, oligarchies are deviant because they 
are conceived along the lines of a commercial enterprise, not a polis (Pol. III 9). And 
existing laws count as lawful and just to the extent that they conform to or approximate 
what ideal legislation aims at, that is, to the extent that they aim at the happiness and 
well-being of the citizens.
Aristotle is therefore able to accept and reject laws as being good, or well-formulated, 
from an objective point of view. And he recognizes that the laws of a corrupt state will 
not be an infallible guide to virtuous action. Only from the perspective of nomothetikê, 
the lawgiver’s art, is it possible to determine which laws are just and which are not. 
But the question “how do you decide which laws of your state are correct and should 
be obeyed?”—that is, the question of individual action—is not a question that he is 
interested in answering, not here and maybe not ever. He may think that citizens of 
a state are obliged to obey its laws as long as they meet to some minimal degree the 
standard set out here: that of producing and preserving happiness and the virtues for a 
political community.16 Perhaps Aristotle thinks that there are so many commonalities 
among different law systems, such as laws against violence and theft (see EN V 7 on the 
prevalence of what he calls “natural” as opposed to “legal” or “conventional” justice), 
that he is generally satisfied that most legal systems meet this minimum standard.17 In 
any case, his project is not to offer guidance to individuals for deciding which laws to 
obey and when, but rather to describe the science whose subject matter is the correct 
administration of the state. He is interested in giving guidance to the legislator who is 
trying to determine what the aim of the best state and laws should be, and this is clearly 
his focus throughout the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics. Hence, the real burden 
on Aristotle is to spell out what kind of laws would promote the common good best 
16 Kraut discusses the difference between the equitable juror or judge who tries to rectify defi-
ciencies in a law, and the citizen who decides that a law is unjust and hence does not require 
compliance (Kraut 2002: 111–18, esp. 110–11), as well as Aristotle’s views on the obligation of 
citizens to “preserve the constitution” and civil disobedience (2002: §10.6–10.8, esp. 379–84).
17 Aristotle’s claim that “Practically the majority of the acts commanded by the law are those 
which are prescribed from the point of view of virtue taken as a whole” may perhaps imply that 
this can be found in most existing laws (EN V 2. 1130b22).
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under what conditions—which is, as he tells us in the last chapter of the Nicomachean 
Ethics, his next task for the Politics.
4. THE VIRTUOUS PERSON IS JUST AND 
ACTS FOR THE COMMON GOOD
Let us turn to the second idea we wanted to explore, the idea that every virtuous person 
is necessarily just, that is, possesses the virtue of general justice and hence a concern 
for the common good. While we may accept Aristotle’s definition of justice as a virtue 
motivated by concern for the common good, and we might grant that the laws of a 
good state should promote the common good, still we might wonder why Aristotle’s 
happy and virtuous person necessarily has to be a just and law-abiding citizen—that is, 
why she should care about promoting the common good.
Let’s begin by examining Aristotle’s argument for identifying general justice with 
the whole of virtue. It is worth quoting the argument in full:
This form of justice, then, is complete virtue, although not without qualification, 
but in relation to our neighbour [αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἀρετὴ μέν ἐστι τελεία, 
ἀu03BB_u03BB’ οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἀu03BB_u03BBὰ πρὸς ἕτερον]. And therefore justice is often thought to be the 
greatest of virtues, and “neither evening nor morning star” is so wonderful; and 
proverbially “in justice is every virtue comprehended.” And it is complete virtue 
in its fullest sense because it is the actual exercise [χρῆσις] of complete virtue. 
It is complete because he who possesses it can exercise his virtue not only in 
himself but towards his neighbour also; for many men can exercise virtue in 
their own affairs, but not in their relations to their neighbour. This is why the 
saying of Bias is thought to be true, that “rule will show the man”; for a ruler is 
necessarily in relation to other men, and a member of a society. For this same 
reason justice, alone of the virtues, is thought to be “another’s good,” because it 
is related to our neighbour; for it does what is advantageous to another, either 
a ruler or a co-partner. Now the worst man is he who exercises his wickedness 
both towards himself and towards his friends, and the best man is not he who 
exercises his virtue towards himself but he who exercises it towards another; for 
this is a difficult task. Justice in this sense, then, is not part of virtue but virtue 
entire, nor is the contrary injustice a part of vice but vice entire [αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ 
δικαιοσύνη οὐ μέρος ἀρετῆς ἀu03BB_u03BB’ ὅλη ἀρετή ἐστιν, οὐδ’ ἡ ἐναντία ἀδικία μέρος κακίας 
ἀu03BB_u03BB’ ὅλη κακία]. (V 1. 1129b25–1130a10)
Aristotle claims that “this form of justice [i.e. general justice], then, is complete virtue, 
although not without qualification, but in relation to another” (V 1. 1129b25–7). To put it 
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another way, justice is coextensive with “the whole of virtue,” though not identical. If one 
has general justice, one necessarily also has all of the special character-virtues all together, 
and conversely, if one has the special virtues, one necessarily also has general justice. 
Though “general justice” and “virtue” may refer to the same dispositions and activities, 
in definition they are different: by calling someone who has one of the special character 
virtues “just,” one is calling attention to a particular aspect of her virtue, namely, her 
“relation to others.” General justice, then, picks out the social or other-regarding aspect 
of virtue, as the term “virtue” does not. As Hardie puts it, “As states or dispositions they 
are the same, but the terms ‘justice’ and ‘injustice’ convey, as ‘virtue’ and ‘vice’ do not, a 
relationship between a man and his neighbours (1130a8–13)” (Hardie 1968: 185).
In addition, Aristotle says that general justice “perfects” the other virtues, by 
extending their exercise beyond oneself. Justice is “complete” or “perfect” virtue, where 
the virtues have been activated not just in a limited sphere of action having to do with 
one’s own affairs, but in every sphere, including one’s relations to other people. One 
may demonstrate courage in attending to one’s own affairs and interests, but that is 
incomplete and imperfect unless one is capable of doing so when it comes to matters 
that affect one’s neighbors as well. That is why those who have been given the oppor-
tunity to govern and administer the affairs of an entire state, not just their own affairs, 
have been given the widest possible scope and latitude in which to “perfect” their vir-
tue—or indeed to perfect their vices.
Thus, anyone who has general justice must also have all the specific virtues, for pos-
session of the specific virtues is in a sense a necessary condition of achieving general 
justice. For one always exercises general justice in some special area (e.g. in matters 
where one’s temper might be provoked or where one’s judgments about liberality are 
required), and in order to exercise general justice in that area one must have the special 
virtue relevant to that area—for example, one’s feelings of fear, anger, or about money 
must be as they should be. Thus, being just is not a matter of passively and blindly 
following the laws—it includes the proper cultivation of character and phronêsis of 
someone who has all the particular virtues, all together. Having the character virtues 
means that one’s appreciation of what the right thing to do is—especially when others 
are involved—is not impeded or occluded by one’s desires and emotions.
Of course, many of the other specific virtues are also essentially other-oriented, 
such as generosity, the virtues having to do with honor, and the conversational virtues, 
as Broadie notes (2002: 34–5). So what then is distinctive about the other-regarding 
aspect of justice? To call an action just is specifically to call attention to the fact that it 
fits in with what the agent owes to others, to do and not to do, whereas to call it gener-
ous is to call attention to the presence or absence of a certain type of special motivation 
and to note that the agent was or was not incorrectly guided by that kind of motivation. 
When we describe someone as generous, we mean that his impulse to give to others 
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is as it should be; his desires to help others are in the right balance between giving too 
little and too much (presumably at the cost of attending to his own needs or doing 
so even when it is not helpful or useful). To call someone “generous” is to praise his 
emotional dispositions and state (with respect to the other-regarding desire to give to 
others) for being properly modulated, such that he is not put off by his own stinginess 
or wastefulness from doing the right thing. But to call a generous person just is to say 
that his generous impulses and actions are what they should be with respect to other 
people—he helps other people in the right way, that is, in accordance with the laws 
and customs that promote the good of the whole. Hence, a generous person is just (or 
“morally good” as we would say) when his charitable giving is in line with our social 
expectation that each of us should try to help friends and fellow citizens whenever we 
can, either for their sake, or for the common good.
Similarly, “courageous” and “just” pick out different aspects of the same disposition. 
When we say that someone is acting courageously (e.g. by defending himself or standing 
at his post in battle), we are pointing to his emotional dispositions and state, and saying 
that his sense of fear and confidence are properly modulated, and do not prevent him 
from seeing and acting on the right thing to do. We say this in abstraction from how his 
actions affect other people—hence, one can act courageously even when no one else is 
involved. But when we say that he is just, we’re drawing attention to the fact that his cou-
rageous action is what it should be with respect to other people—namely, his actions are 
in accordance with laws that promote the good of others—say the good of the soldiers in 
his platoon, that of the whole army, and ultimately that of the community he is defend-
ing. Thus, the courageous person is just when, for example, he stands at his post, even at 
peril to life or limb, precisely because the law and the common good require it of him.
If this is correct, then we might venture further and make a distinction between the 
disposition to act in conformity with what the laws prescribe, and the disposition to 
act out of respect for the law and its intent. Someone who is mindlessly obedient to the 
law acts in conformity with the law simply because this is what the law requires. But 
if she not only (a) acts in conformity with the laws and norms generally accepted by 
the community, but also (b) acts out of respect for other citizens and for the laws gov-
erning them, then she is just. She acts in conformity with the law not simply to avoid 
censure or punishment, nor because she is in the habit of acting in a generous, mild, 
or temperate fashion, but because she endorses those laws and what they demand of 
her and others.18
18 That is, general justice is, as Broadie puts it, “a sort of meta-excellence: one that has its own sort 
of motive and gives rise to some actions of its own [i.e. lawful ones], but is not expressed in any 
area that is special or exclusive to itself ” (Broadie 2002: 35).
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Now Aristotle doesn’t precisely say this in the Nicomachean Ethics—he doesn’t use 
the Kantian language of “acting out of respect for the law.” What he does say, instead, is 
that it is distinctive of the virtuous agent that she aims at the fine or the noble (to kalon), 
and that she chooses to do virtuous action “because it is fine” or “for the sake of the 
noble.”19 Thus, for example, courage is described as “a mean with respect to things that 
inspire confidence or fear, in the circumstances that have been stated; and it chooses 
or endures things because it is noble to do so, or because it is base not to do so” (EN III 
8. 1116a10–12).20 It is remarkable and odd, given its evident importance, that Aristotle 
nowhere explains in the Nicomachean Ethics the concept of the fine and noble. I think 
this is because Aristotle doesn’t think of it as a technical notion, but one that is familiar 
and obvious from common use. He discusses its common use—the grounds on which 
an action or person is commonly taken to be “fine”—in Rhetoric I 9 and in Eudemian 
Ethics VIII 3. From these and other passages, it is clear that someone who cares about 
what is fine is not exclusively concerned with her own self-interest (Rhet. I 3. 1358b38; 
II 12. 1389a32–5; II 13. 1389b35; EN II 3. 1104b31; IX 8. 1169a6). Rather, what is 
characteristic of fine actions is that they benefit others (Rhet. I 9. 1366b3–4, EN IV 
1. 1120a11, 1121a27–30, IV 2. 1123a31–2).21
Take for example Aristotle’s distinction between “civic” (politikê) courage and real 
courage: “Citizen-soldiers seem to face dangers because of the penalties imposed by 
the laws and the reproaches they would otherwise incur, and because of the honours 
they win by such action . . . . This kind of courage is most like to that which we described 
earlier [i.e. real courage], because it is due to virtue; for it is due to shame and to desire 
of a noble object (i.e. honour) and avoidance of disgrace, which is ignoble” (EN III 
8. 1116a18–21, 27–9). The citizen soldier is motivated by something noble—namely, 
fear of disgrace, and love of honor. While this person is better than someone who fol-
lows the general’s commands simply to avoid punishment, he falls short of the really 
courageous person, who acts “for the sake of the noble,” for the courageous person is 
19 A point I owe to Gisela Striker.
20 See also III 8. 1115b12, 1116a28, b2–3, 1117b9, 14. The other virtues are also all described 
as present when the agent acts “for the sake of the fine or noble,” including temperance (III 11. 
1119a18: “If something is pleasant and conducive to health or fitness, he will desire this moder-
ately and in the right way; and he will desire in the same way anything else that is pleasant if it 
is no obstacle to health and fitness, does not deviate from what is fine, and does not exceed his 
means”; and also b16), generosity (IV 1. 1120a12, 23), magnificence (IV 2. 1122b6: “In this sort 
of spending the magnificent person will aim at what is fine, since that is a common feature of the 
virtues”; see also 1123a24), and justice (V 9. 1136b22).
21 Here I have found Irwin 2007: 206–9 very helpful. I am in agreement with his explanation of 
the connection between virtue, the fine, and the common good; for a different view, see Rogers 
1993 and Lear 2004 on to kalon. Lear thinks that calling an action kalon is to draw attention to 
the teleological features of an action, e.g. the presence of order and symmetry and form in it.
118 ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS AND PRACTICAL REASONING
not thinking of himself at all, but of the good of the community, and what will happen 
to it if he does not act. By contrast, the citizen-soldier is thinking of the wrong thing, 
namely glory if he acts well, and disgrace if he does not. Gaining glory for oneself is 
of course a noble and admirable thing, in Aristotle’s view (in comparison for example 
to living an obscure and undistinguished life), but to act for the sake of the noble is to 
act not because glory will follow but because it is required for the good of his fellow 
soldiers, and the whole community. In other passages, Aristotle frequently describes 
those who do things “for the sake of friends and fatherland” as “choosing what is fine.”
In a discussion of self-love, Aristotle again emphasizes that the true self-lover acts 
for the sake of the noble, where this means acting for the common good, or the good 
of others:
It is true of the good man too that he does many acts for the sake of his friends 
and his country, and if necessary dies for them; for he will throw away both 
wealth and honours and in general the goods that are objects of competition, 
gaining for himself nobility (περιποιούμενος ἑαυτῷ τὸ καλόν); since he would 
prefer a short period of intense pleasure to a long one of mild enjoyment, a 
twelvemonth of noble life (καλῶς) to many years of humdrum existence, and 
one great and noble action (μίαν πρᾶξιν καλὴν καὶ μεγάλην) to many trivial ones. 
Now those who die for others doubtless attain this result; it is therefore a great 
prize (μέγα καλὸν) that they choose for themselves. (IX 8. 1169a18–26)
Here, Aristotle describes doing things for the sake of friends and fatherland as “choos-
ing what is fine.”
We can now see why Aristotle thinks that the virtuous person is necessarily some-
one who cares about the common good—it is already built into the virtues that the 
virtuous person acts for the sake of the fine, where that means, in this context, acting 
for the common good. General justice, then, is the virtue of someone who acts out of 
respect for the common good. Since the laws are supposed to spell out what is required 
for the common good, the virtuous person is necessarily lawful.
Now one might object to the thesis that when Aristotle says that the virtuous per-
son acts for the sake of the noble, that what he means is that the virtuous person acts 
for the sake of the common good. This has been labeled by Kelly Rogers the “altruistic 
interpretation” of to kalon, and she rejects it, on the grounds that it is not part of the 
concept of the fine that it just means “for the common good.” Although it may be cor-
rect that “fine” does not mean “for the common good,” nevertheless, in the context of 
what people regard as most admirable in fellow members of their community, “acting 
for the sake of the fine” does refer to acting for the sake of the common good. It is 
misleading to call this the “altruistic” interpretation, since this equates Aristotle’s idea 
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that justice is acting for the common good with Thrasymachus’ idea that justice is act-
ing for someone else’s good. It would be more accurate to call this the political sense of 
the term “to kalon.”
Irwin, who is the most prominent advocate of this reading, agrees that “for the 
sake of the fine” does not mean “for the common good” (2007: 207); rather, the fine 
is what is admirable—and things can be admired for many reasons, such as for being 
aesthetically beautiful, or for being impractical and hence tokens of luxury (e.g. long 
hair for men). What is fine is either that which is admired by people, or that which is 
most deserving of admiration—that is, that which is most worthwhile, as we might 
say, or of supreme value. It is in this stricter sense of “most deserving of admiration” 
that actions aiming at the common good are “fine”: political communities organized 
around the principle of mutual and shared happy lives regard these actions as most 
deserving of admiration and praise (EE VIII 3. 1248b17–25; cf. EN I 12. 1101b31–2; 
VIII 1. 1155a28–31; Rhet. I 9. 1366a33–6, 1367b28). And they are deserving of such 
praise because they benefit many rather than one, as Aristotle explains at the beginning 
of the Nicomachean Ethics:
For even if the end is the same for a single man and for a state, that of the state 
seems at all events something greater and more complete whether to attain or 
to preserve; though it is worth while to attain the end merely for one man, 
it is finer and more godlike to attain it for a nation or for city-states. (EN I 2. 
1094b7–10)22
Thus, to say that attainment of the final good for an entire city-state is “fine” or noble 
is to say that it is admirable, and it is admirable because it is simply better and more 
worthwhile to bring about the good for a whole community than for a single indi-
vidual. Politikê, the science of producing the good for all the members of a city-state, is 
the highest science because its end—the common good—is the noblest and finest end 
of all. Thus, what is regarded as most noble and admirable by political communities is 
in fact what promotes the common good.
It is a commonplace in classical Greek oratory and in Herodotus that the law directs 
people to do what is noble, and the two most typical examples of what is noble are 
(1) fighting for one’s country, and (2) respecting one’s parents (i.e. caring for and sup-
porting them financially in old age). Both are examples of virtuous actions which ben-
efit others. They are noble because they are actions that are highly worthy of praise, and 
22 εἰ γὰρ καὶ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἑνὶ καὶ πόλει, μεῖζόν γε καὶ τελειότερον τὸ τῆς πόλεως φαίνεται καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ 
σῴζειν· ἀγαπητὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἑνὶ μόνῳ, κάu03BB_u03BBιον δὲ καὶ θειότερον ἔθνει καὶ πόλεσιν.
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what makes them praiseworthy is the fact that they require one to set aside self-interest 
narrowly construed and act for the good of others.
Aristotle thinks that it is the job of the laws to set fine or noble ends for the citizens. 
Examples of noble ends set by the state include funding the construction of a new 
warship or financing a theater production for the enjoyment of one’s fellow citizens 
(Striker 2006; see e.g. EN IV 2. 1122b19–23). The laws thereby get people to do actions 
that promote the common good and happiness and to love doing what is fine and 
noble. Furthermore, they also encourage virtuous behavior, and hence virtue, in the 
citizens of a state.
The character, then, must somehow be there already with a kinship to virtue, 
loving what is noble and hating what is base. But it is difficult to get from youth 
up a right training for virtue if one has not been brought up under right laws. 
(X 9. 1179b29–32)23
This is why some think that legislators ought to stimulate men to virtue and 
urge them forward by the motive of the noble, on the assumption that those 
who have been well advanced by the formation of habits will attend to such 
influences. (X 9. 1180a5–8)24
These passages make it clear that Aristotle thinks that the laws are supposed to educate 
people by causing them to learn to love doing what is fine.
In a passage where Aristotle is distinguishing the true self-lover from the rank ego-
ist, Aristotle describes the common benefit that results when everyone is eager to do 
fine actions:
. . . Hence he will count as “self-lover” the most—not the same kind people speak 
of censoriously, but different by as much as living by reason differs from living by 
emotion, and desiring the fine, on the one hand, from desiring what appears to 
bring advantage on the other. Those, then, who are exceptionally eager for fine 
actions are welcomed and praised by everyone; and if everyone vied for what is 
fine, and strained to do the finest things, not only would everything be as it should 
on the communal level but as individuals too each person would be possessed of 
the greatest goods, given that excellence is such a thing. Thus the good person 
23 δεῖ δὴ τὸ ἦθος προϋπάρχειν πως οἰκεῖον τῆς ἀρετῆς, στέργον τὸ καλὸν καὶ δυσχεραῖνον τὸ αἰσχρόν. ἐκ 
νέου δ’ ἀγωγῆς ὀρθῆς τυχεῖν πρὸς ἀρετὴν χαλεπὸν μὴ ὑπὸ τοιούτοις τραφέντα νόμοις.
24 διόπερ οἴονταί τινες τοὺς νομοθετοῦντας δεῖν μὲν παρακαλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ προτρέπεσθαι τοῦ 
καλοῦ χάριν, ὡς ἐπακουσομένων τῶν ἐπιεικῶς τοῖς ἔθεσι προηγμένων.
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should be a self-lover, since by doing what is fine he will both be better off him-
self and benefit others, but the bad one should not; for he will harm both himself 
and those round him through following worthless attractions. (trans. Rowe, EN 
IX 8. 1169a3–15)
Aristotle claims that (1) by doing what is fine, each person is better off (because he acts 
virtuously) and also benefits others (because actions are kalon which benefit others), and 
(2) if the competitive impulse is harnessed so that everyone is eager to do fine things, then 
the whole group or community will be better off—presumably because the whole com-
munity is better off when its members are in competition so to speak to see who can do 
the most for others. Institutions that encourage this kind of competition in virtue benefit 
the community as a whole.25
Thus, good laws will be crafted in such a way that they endorse and recommend cer-
tain actions because they promote ends that are fine and supremely worthwhile, and will 
attach sanctions to noncompliance. Some people will obey such laws only out of fear of 
punishment. But others will do it because these actions are fine—that is, they promote the 
common good. But one can see that acting for the common good need not imply some 
kind of pure and selfless altruism or benevolence. It is entirely consistent with acting for 
the common good that one should do so because this indirectly benefits oneself, and that 
one should look forward to the praise and honor that will be one’s just desert. Acting for 
the sake of the fine thus seems to me less like altruism and more like civic-mindedness, 
with its respect for one’s fellow citizens and its willingness to participate fully in the coop-
erative ventures that constitute the city. And it would help to explain why Aristotle so 
frequently associates justice with civic or political friendship; each is necessary for, and 
fosters, the other. That it is natural to human beings to act in these ways is, I believe, part 
of what Aristotle means when he says that man is a “political animal.”26
5. CONCLUSION
I will conclude by making two broad points about what I hope to have shown. First of 
all, it is unfortunate that justice is, of all the virtues and ethical concepts in Aristotle, 
the most neglected. This is partly due to the very rough and disjointed state of the 
book on justice in the Ethics, a book that is clearly an early draft in need of revision. It 
25 Cf. Demosthenes, Against Leptines 20.5: Demosthenes says that if you give people rewards for 
virtuous behavior, they will vie with each other to see who can do the most for the city.
26 Pol. I 2. 1253a7–18, III 6. 1278b15–30; EN VIII 12. 1162a16–19, IX 9. 1169b16–22, EE VII 10. 
1242a19–28.
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may also be due to current fashions in virtue ethics, which in centralizing the concept 
of virtue have tended to marginalize that of justice, with its Kantian overtones of duty 
and obligation. In any case, this often means that readers assume that Aristotle’s ethics 
can be described purely in terms of his moral psychology and theory of the individual 
virtues. But when Aristotle describes general justice as the same as the whole of virtue, 
he clearly means that virtue and justice are, for him, two ways of talking about the same 
thing. This shows that his theory of justice is, in fact, central to his project in the Ethics.
Second, the law plays a much more interesting role in Aristotle’s theory than one 
might have thought. Particular laws will provide the starting points in the practical 
reasoning of virtuous agents. Further investigation of this will show, I believe, that 
what makes virtuous agents possess understanding of these starting points—what 
allows them to apply the law not blindly but with understanding—is the fact that they 
are capable of taking the point of view of the legislator—of reasoning about the com-
mon good, and how it can be achieved, from an impartial perspective (e.g. EN VI 8, 
Pol. III 4). It is, in any case, the point of view of the legislator that is Aristotle’s primary 
concern. There are of course large questions about what the common good is, and how 
Aristotle thinks it can be achieved—but those require further study, especially of the 
Politics.
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